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I N T R O D U C T I O N
D i s a s t e r s ,  N a t u r a l  a n d  O t h e r w i s e
Drive through any suburban area and you are likely to find subdivi-sions with names like “Oak Tree Farms,” “Meadow View,” and 
“Eagle’s Nest.” But try to find the features that inspired those names, 
and you may discover that the trees, meadows, and nests have given 
way to farms, neighborhoods, and lush lawns. Are those places still 
“natural,” even though sod has replaced meadow, and dog houses have 
replaced bird nests? Walk into any grocery store and there will probably 
be an aisle dedicated to natural foods. Does that suggest, somehow, that 
the stock filling the rest of the aisles is “unnatural”?
 The fuzzy line between natural and unnatural reflects ambivalent 
attitudes toward nature. We idealize it, naming our neighborhoods 
and our healthiest foods in its honor. And yet we also see nature as an 
adversary to be conquered, blaming it for such “natural disasters” as 
floods, storms, hurricanes, and erosion. Sometimes, we even blame the 
Almighty and attribute our woes to “acts of God.”
 Nowhere is this tension clearer than in the Mississippi River basin. 
The great river and its tributaries flow through, drain, or form the bor-
der of more than thirty states. Overall, the Mississippi drains about 40 
percent of the continental United States, from Montana to New York, 
from New Mexico to North Carolina, and from Minnesota down to 
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Louisiana. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the federal agency in 
charge of managing the river, describes it as one of the nation’s “out-
standing assets.” But the Corps also asserts that the Mississippi, in its 
natural condition, represents a “liability . . . [that poses] a threat to the 
security of the valley through which it flows.”1
 When calamity strikes in the Mississippi basin, our first impulse is 
to shudder at the uncontrollable fury of nature. We sense, deep in our 
gut, that it was only a matter of time before the Mississippi unleashed 
a natural disaster, revealing itself as the deadly liability recognized by 
the Corps. And what’s worse, we fear that we have no control over the 
disaster and that we are powerless to stop it. Nothing could be further 
from the truth.
War in the Mississippi Basin
The Mississippi River flows through one of the most highly engi-
neered river basins in the world. Today, if you were to fly over the river, 
you might think that the upper Mississippi was not a river at all, but 
rather a chain of large lakes, one thousand miles long and as much 
as three miles wide. Concrete chambers — locks — punctuate the upper 
Mississippi, serving as a watery staircase that allows boats of all shapes 
and sizes to navigate the river’s uneven course. Crafts headed down-
stream wait in one lock as the dam opens and water drains into the lock 
below, and then continue on their journey when the levels are equal-
ized. To travel upstream, the process is reversed: boats wait in the lower 
lock, floating up as dam-released water flows in from above. There are 
twenty-nine pairs of such locks and dams on the upper Mississippi, 
extending from northern Minnesota past St. Louis to the mouth of the 
Ohio River at Cairo (pronounced Kay-roh), Illinois. This river segment 
has been transformed so dramatically that it resembles a set of steps 
more than a natural water body. The architect of the transformation, 
the Army Corps of Engineers, refers to its handiwork as a “stairway 
of water.”2
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 The locks are a marvel of modern engineering. But even before they 
were built, engineers had attempted to tame the river by dredging mud 
and silt from its channels and by blanketing its shoreline with levees, 
floodwalls, jetties, and other structures designed to control floods. Now, 
a 1,607-mile levee system lines the lower Mississippi River, from Cairo 
all the way downstream to the Gulf of Mexico. An additional 596 miles 
of levees extend along southern tributaries of the river.3
 A bird’s-eye view of the Mississippi delta, where the river meets the 
gulf, reveals multiple hues of blues and browns, where freshwater mixes 
Left scale shows river elevation in feet above sea level; bottom scale shows river miles to 
the confluence with the Ohio River at Cairo, Illinois
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
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with seawater and where silt, sand, and clay are deposited, layer by 
layer, creating side streams called distributaries that carry water and 
sediment to the ocean. In addition to these natural distributaries are 
channels that have been dredged into the delta to promote shipping 
and oil and gas development. Situated between the distributaries and 
channels are low-lying pockets of land created from river deposits — 
bayous, marshes, and coastal wetlands — that look like the webbing of 
a duck’s foot.
 The Corps of Engineers has struggled mightily to control the Mis-
sissippi — an effort it likens to war. The metaphor is not surprising, 
given the Corps’ military pedigree. On the eve of the American Revo-
lution, the Continental Congress established not only the Army, but 
also named a chief of engineers. (Colonel Richard Gridley, appointed 
in 1775, was the first.) Since that time, the chief and his Corps — made 
up of both military and civilian personnel — have provided engineering 
support for military and civilian matters. In the Corps’ words, its mis-
sion is to “[p]rovide vital public engineering services in peace and war 
to strengthen our Nation’s security, energize the economy, and reduce 
risks from disasters.”4
 The Corps takes the risk-reduction aspect of its mission seriously, 
particularly when it comes to the Mississippi basin. In vivid prose, 
unexpected in a bureaucratic document, the Corps’ Mississippi Valley 
Division describes the focus of its work as the “contumacious” Mis-
sissippi River. Explaining the difficulty of its task, the Corps refers to 
the river as both “beast” and “benefactor”: “This Janus-faced colossus 
periodically seeks to challenge the flood control system imposed upon 
it, while its opposite profile is a vital waterway network that extends 
into the heart of the nation — a true cornerstone of our economy.”5
 “Contumacious”? “Janus-faced colossus”? The Army does not 
mince words — or tread lightly — when it comes to battle with what it 
perceives as the stubborn and willfully disobedient river. Clearly, the 
Mississippi River has been modified by many human hands, including 
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those of the Corps, following the instructions of Congress, responding 
to the will of the electorate. But just as clearly, some of those efforts 
have backfired.
Law and Unnatural Disasters
To examine the relationship between human action and disaster, 
legal scholars have called for the development of a new area of study. In 
2006, professors Daniel A. Farber and Jim Chen published Disasters 
and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, a law school textbook that consid-
ers legal rules that deal with catastrophic risks, including prevention, 
insurance, emergency response, compensation, and rebuilding strate-
gies. As the authors explained, “we are all stunned by each new disaster, 
but rapidly come to view it as exceptional and never to be repeated. 
Thus, we fail to prepare for the next one.”6 Instead of this insufficient, 
piecemeal response, the authors highlight the need for a comprehensive 
legal approach to major disasters. The developing field has come to be 
known as disaster law.
 The systematic study of disaster poses intellectual puzzles that 
involve law and a variety of other academic disciplines. One of the 
thorniest questions — and one of the main themes of this book — is 
where to draw the line between “natural” and “unnatural” disasters. 
This challenge was taken up by historian Ted Steinberg in Acts of God: 
The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America. Steinberg 
traces the practice of blaming nature for calamity to the late nineteenth 
century, when the wide-spread belief that disasters were God’s punish-
ment for sin gradually gave way to the notion of nature as culprit in a 
shift that neatly excused humans from moral or other accountability 
for harm. As Steinberg argues, “This constrained vision of responsi-
bility, this belief that such disasters stem solely from random natural 
forces, is tantamount to saying that they lie entirely outside human 
history, beyond our influence, beyond moral reason, beyond control.” 
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Blaming nature also proved to be politically expedient, as powerful 
figures sought to “normalize calamity.” By convincing us that we should 
expect random strikes of nature, Steinberg concludes, our leaders “have 
been able to rationalize the economic choices that help to explain why 
the poor and people of color — who have largely borne the brunt of 
these disasters — tend to wind up in harm’s way.”7
The Law Falls Short: A Brief Detour 
outside the Mississippi Basin
Today, hydrologists and hydrogeologists can tell us much about 
the movement of water. Their study includes runoff processes, stream-
flow routing, and flood frequency analysis. The scientists examine the 
relationship between rivers and groundwater. Moreover, they develop 
complex computer models to describe the action of water under a 
variety of scenarios. The terminology can be daunting to a layperson: 
unconfined aquifer, hydraulic conductivity, transmissivity, Darcy’s law, 
evapotranspiration.
 Overall, scientists have learned that a variety of factors — both natu-
ral and human — can influence the behavior of water. Before all this 
study, early judges were perplexed by the movement of water. When it 
came to underground water, in particular, many threw up their hands 
in befuddlement. As one Connecticut judge explained in 1850, “The 
laws of [groundwater’s] existence and progress . . . cannot be known or 
regulated. It rises to great heights, and moves collaterally, by influences 
beyond our apprehension. These influences are so secret, changeable 
and uncontrollable, we cannot subject them to the regulations of law, 
nor build upon them a system or rules, as has been done with streams 
upon the surface.”8
 Disputes over surface water were a little easier for judges, but even 
so, they struggled to sort out the natural and human causes of flooding. 
Under one popular legal theory — the common enemy doctrine — judges 
recognized a common need to vanquish floodwaters, and refused to 
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hold anyone accountable for redirecting surface flow and incidentally 
drowning out the neighbors. This theory took to heart the ancient Latin 
maxim that translates as “To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns 
also to the sky and to the depths.” Under this view, landowners could 
manipulate the water and soil of their property with impunity, from 
the bowels of the earth to the heavens above. For example, in one case, 
a property owner changed the drainage pattern of his land to such an 
extent that it caused water to back up inside his neighbor’s house, to 
overcome its septic system, and to fill the house and yard with three feet 
of water and the pervasive odor of raw sewage. Still, recognizing flood 
water as an enemy to all, the court refused to hold the first landowner 
responsible, even though the sequence of cause and effect was clear.9 A 
second approach, known as the natural flow rule (or the civil law rule), 
went to the opposite extreme. Instead of encouraging a mad scramble 
of uncoordinated drainage measures, it cut off self-protection with the 
threat of legal liability. Under this rule, landowners could not obstruct 
the natural flow of surface water, including floods, by any means what-
soever if such efforts would harm their neighbors.10
 Over time, judges recognized the impracticality and unfairness of 
both theories. Increasingly, they cast aside both the common enemy and 
natural flow rules, noting their “anarchic” nature and their “deplorable 
rigidity,” respectively. In the words of one judge, in a mature economy 
it makes little sense that land development costs “should be borne in 
every case by adjoining landowners rather than by those who engage in 
such projects for profit.”11 As a replacement for the older rules, judges 
turned to the compromise reasonable use standard, which holds land-
owners accountable for harm to others, but only if their interference 
with the flow of surface waters and use of their property is “unrea-
sonable.” Under this approach, a mere cause-and-effect relationship 
between action and harm is not enough to trigger legal liability. Overall, 
jurists praise the rule of reasonableness for its fairness and flexibility. 
But the distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” actions is 
notoriously squishy, and plagues numerous legal disputes well beyond 
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the context of flooding. Where should courts draw the line? As one 
judge explained as early as 1894, “In a philosophical sense, the con-
sequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event 
go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to 
impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability 
for all wrongful acts.”12
 The core problem is this: we want to extend responsibility far enough 
to deter or punish socially undesirable actions, but not so far that the 
result is unfair or unworkable. It’s a tough challenge. Just ask any law 
student who has studied the 1924 case of the unfortunate Mrs. Palsgraf.
* * *
Mrs. Helen Palsgraf was injured in 1924 at a New York railroad 
station through an unusual turn of events: A tardy passenger attempted 
to board a moving train. Two helpful railroad employees reached out to 
assist, accidentally causing the passenger to drop a newspaper-wrapped 
parcel. The package turned out to contain fireworks, which exploded 
on impact with the ground. The resultant vibrations knocked over sev-
eral large scales used for weighing luggage, which were located at the 
other end of the railroad platform. They tumbled onto the unsuspect-
ing Mrs. Palsgraf as she waited for her train more than twenty-five feet 
away from the late-arriving passenger. Basing her suit on the somewhat 
unlikely chain of events that had unfolded, Mrs. Palsgraf sued the Long 
Island Railroad Company for her injuries.
 There was no question that Mrs. Palsgraf had in fact been hurt that 
day. It was also clear that she would not have been injured in the absence 
of the railroad employees’ actions. Despite these factors, the New 
York court ruled against her in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Com-
pany. Eminent jurist Benjamin Cardozo, joined by three other judges, 
emphasized that not all actors who cause harm bear legal responsibil-
ity. Articulating the often-repeated zone of danger rationale, Cardozo 
asserted that although the railroad employees reasonably could have 
anticipated that shoving the passenger might hurt someone (most likely, 
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the passenger himself ), they could not have anticipated that dislodging 
the passenger’s innocuous-looking parcel posed a risk of harm to Mrs. 
Palsgraf in particular, who was standing many feet away.
  Judge Andrews and two other judges disagreed with Judge Car-
dozo. In their dissenting opinion, they argued that the railroad should 
have been held accountable as the proximate cause (or legal cause) of 
the accident because there was “a natural and continuous sequence 
between cause and effect” and thus, it was “reasonably foreseeable” 
that someone would have been injured by the shove, even if the pre-
cise sequence of events could not have been predicted. Today, judges 
regard both tests — zone of danger and foreseeability — as useful tools 
for sorting out who should be held accountable for accidents. Almost 
a century after Mrs. Palsgraf ’s case, these doctrines are still used to 
determine legal responsibility for harm of all sorts, including flooding 
in the Mississippi basin, as described in subsequent chapters.
Fire in the Gulf of Mexico
Old habits die hard. In particular, it’s tough to stop thinking of 
all watery catastrophes as “natural” events, or at least as unpredict-
able accidents. In April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil-drilling rig 
exploded in a ball of flame. Floating in almost a mile of water, the rig was 
just beyond the continental shelf and about forty miles off the coast of 
Louisiana where the Mississippi River dumps into the Gulf of Mexico. 
Slowly, the rig sank to the bottom. Oil gushed from the Macondo well 
and fouled the gulf and its wildlife while British Petroleum, the well’s 
owner, tried one unsuccessful fix after another. BP fumbled for almost 
three months before it was able to stem the flow of oil. All the while, 
the world watched real-time undersea videos as BP tried to maneuver 
well-sealing equipment precisely into position.
 Clearly, the “experts” were unprepared for such a disaster. As part 
of its application for a federal drilling permit, BP submitted an oil 
spill response plan. Among other things, the plan discussed potential 
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impacts to walruses. Embarrassingly enough, walruses had not graced 
the waters of the gulf for some three million years. The response plan, 
it appears, was a cut-and-paste effort that incorporated risk analyses 
from applications to drill in Arctic waters, where walrus populations 
can indeed be found. The plan also listed the telephone number of 
Peter Lutz, a wildlife specialist in Florida who could provide advice in 
the event of an emergency. As it turned out, Mr. Lutz would be unable 
to offer assistance during the 2010 blowout because, unfortunately, he 
had passed away in 2005. But BP alone cannot be blamed for the bum-
bling disaster plan. Later, a congressional panel determined that Exxon 
Mobil, Chevron, and Conoco Phillips all relied on similarly flawed con-
tingency plans for drilling in the gulf. With each one citing the need 
to protect walruses, and several of them providing the phone number 
of the late Mr. Lutz, these plans were derided as “cookie cutter” by 
the panel.
 Nothing about the circumstances of the BP fire was natural. The 
rig was a behemoth of four decks stacked one above the other, topped 
off by a twenty-five-story oil derrick. The national commission that 
investigated the disaster, moved beyond dry, bureaucratic reporting, 
described how “the derrick fire roared upward into the night sky, an 
inferno throwing off searing heat and clouds of black smoke. The blind-
ing yellow of the flames was the only illumination except for the occa-
sional flashlight.” In all, eleven people died. Others escaped in the rig’s 
lifeboats, lowering themselves down 125 feet from the rig to the gulf.
 Afterward, there was plenty of blame (and legal liability) to go 
around. The national commission found fault with BP (as owner of 
the Macondo well), with the Halliburton Company (as the contractor 
that provided the well casing), and with Transocean, Ltd. (as owner of 
the drilling rig). In addition, the commission faulted the federal over-
sight agency formerly known as the Minerals Management Service for 
inadequate regulation of deepwater drilling projects.
 National investigations revealed that the Macondo well blowout was 
anything but natural. Still, it involved natural elements — fire, water, the 
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sea floor, and the air that fanned the flames. Soon after the catastrophe, 
BP’s CEO, Tony Hayward, appeared on the Today Show to reassure 
the public in the wake of what he described as a “natural disaster.” 
Perhaps this was a mere slip of the tongue from a man who quickly 
demonstrated a knack for sabotaging his own public relations efforts 
by saying the wrong thing at the wrong time. But one month later, a 
group of congressional leaders repeated Hayward’s error when they 
asserted, “The oil spill in the Gulf is this nation’s largest natural disaster 
and stopping the leak and cleaning up the region is our top priority.”13 
If the Deepwater Horizon incident does not qualify as an “unnatural 
disaster,” it’s hard to imagine what would.
* * *
This distinction is particularly vexing — and important — in the 
Mississippi basin. In truth, it’s a stretch today to describe the river as 
anything close to “natural.” As the next chapter explains, over the past 
century, we have straightened, channelized, dammed, and rip-rapped 
the Mississippi, all in an effort to keep it in its channel and away from its 
natural floodplain. Ever higher levees and stronger floodwalls — supple-
mented by federal insurance and disaster relief — lure more and more 
people into the floodplain, which in turn requires more extreme mea-
sures to protect those people. Meanwhile, we have cut off the river’s 
natural pressure-relief valve — its floodplain — leaving it no good place 
to go when the rains come.
 Through these efforts, humans have demonstrated an uncanny abil-
ity to exacerbate the damage caused by natural hazards. Through our 
laws and public policies, through shortsighted and misguided engineer-
ing projects, and through poor individual decisions, we have increased, 
rather than decreased, the destructive power unleashed by natural 
forces. This book pays particular attention to the legal dimension of 
unnatural disaster. It tells the story of landmark laws and judicial deci-
sions affecting flooding in the Mississippi basin, and focuses on three 
main topics. First, it traces how perceptions of the boundary between 
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“natural” and “unnatural” disaster have shifted over time, affecting how 
the courts have assigned legal accountability for storm and hurricane 
damage. Second, it recounts Congress’ response to roughly a century of 
flooding, telling the tales of seven of the most devastating floods in the 
basin’s history, and Congress’ modification of one policy after another, 
as seemingly good ideas revealed themselves to be recipes for disaster. 
Finally, the book concludes with specific suggestions for rethinking 
disaster responsibility and prevention, with an eye toward the fair and 
sustainable allocation of risk and the avoidance of so-called moral haz-
ards — poorly conceived laws and policies that provide a soft landing 
for those who make unnecessarily risky decisions.
 The stories of this book offer lessons to guide us in the future. They 
show humans at their worst and their best — prideful and humbled; 
arrogant and accomplished; foolish and industrious. The following 
pages contain tales of engineers, bootleggers, church camps, restau-
rants, and dynamite-wielding convicts, among others. Often, with 
the best of intentions, human actions have set the stage for unnatu-
ral disaster.
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